# Bond and MEV Theft

## Why a 0.5 ETH Bond per Validator?

MEV theft occurs when validators, swayed by the temptation of larger block rewards, change their --fee recipient address to divert rewards away from the pool. This not only undermines trust but also disproportionately impacts the rewards distribution among all pool participants.

**Balancing Security and Accessibility**

To prevent such occurrences, we've implemented a bond requirement for each validator. The bond acts as a security deposit – its size is crucial in deterring MEV theft. The logic is straightforward: for MEV theft to be financially viable for a malicious actor, the potential block reward must exceed twice the bond amount plus any accrued rewards. This formula ensures that MEV theft is economically unfeasible in over 99% of blocks.

However, we faced a pivotal decision: to significantly increase the bond to cover outlier cases of very large block rewards, or to set a more accessible bond. We chose the latter, setting the bond at 0.5 ETH. This decision was informed by several factors:

1. **Technical Barrier**: Knowingly executing MEV theft based on bid amount requires a high level of technical complexity which also exposes the validator to potential slashing risks.
2. **Community Trust**: We believe in the goodwill and integrity of our participants. The Smoothly Protocol is built on mutual trust, with safeguards like the bond in place without imposing prohibitive barriers.
3. **Impact on Rewards**: While large block rewards are a significant portion of total pool rewards, increasing the bond excessively could deter many potential validators from participating.